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HEALTH & CONSUMERS DIRECTORATE-GENERAL  
Directorate F - Food and Veterinary Office

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FINAL REPORT OF A MISSION  
CARRIED OUT IN  
ITALY  
FROM 17 JUNE TO 26 JUNE 2008  
IN ORDER TO  
EVALUATE THE SITUATION CONCERNING AFRICAN SWINE FEVER AND  
SWINE VESICULAR DISEASE.

### ***Executive Summary***

*A mission was carried out in Italy from 17 to 26 June 2008 in order to evaluate the situation concerning African Swine Fever and Swine Vesicular Disease. For SVD, 2 regions were inspected. ASF in Italy only exists on the island of Sardinia with the last registered outbreaks in April 2008. Italy submits plans for the control and eradication of both diseases on a yearly basis for approval by the Commission.*

*The competent authorities have clear structures and divisions of tasks. However, shortcomings were noticed concerning certification (of animal movements, correlation between certificates) and measures on site (proper maintenance of sheds, cleaning and disinfection).*

*In the regions visited for SVD, disease control generally follows the approved plans (a new approved plan was published during the inspection which was already in use in one region visited). Some Italian regions have furthermore introduced their own regional plans with measures going beyond those foreseen in the national plan. Control of SVD therefore is standardised by the national plan but also adapted to the local situation by regional measures.*

*In the case of ASF, the strategy of compensation for outbreaks has been changed. The onus is now on the owner of a holding to demonstrate compliance with bio-security requirements in order to be eligible for compensation. In some recent ASF outbreaks, compensation has not been paid for culled animals and sanctions have been applied if the holding was found not to be in accordance with the legislation (e.g. incorrect register or movement documentation). The main constraint on eradication of the disease remains clandestine grazing of pigs in an area of Sardinia that cannot be controlled easily due to its geographical structure. These pigs, and the wild boar they can contact, continue to provide a niche for the virus and full control of the area will not be obtained without the cooperation of the clandestine pig holders. For the first time, communication between all interest groups involved and the CA was demonstrated to the inspection team. Pilot projects have been introduced to find alternatives to traditional holdings that both suit the pig holders and can be ASF-controlled.*

*The National Pig Data Base is still not fully operational. Registration of pig holdings, their health status and the movement of pigs are crucial information for the eradication and control of SVD and ASF. The regions visited had most of the holdings registered and the majority of pig holdings seen were geo-referenced. One region entered information on the health status of the holdings and used the data base for pig movement information, while another region had linked the national data base with a local data base on laboratory results on SVD samples.*

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## ABBREVIATIONS & SPECIAL TERMS USED IN THE REPORT

<b>Abbreviation</b>	<b>Explanation</b>
ASF	African Swine Fever
ASL	<i>Azienda Sanitaria Locale</i> (local competent authority)
CA	Competent authority
CCA	Central competent authority
FVO	Food and Veterinary Office
IZS	<i>Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale</i>
NRL	National Reference Laboratory
OEVR	<i>Osservatorio Epidemiologico Veterinario della Regione</i>
OIE	World Organisation for Animal Health
OV	Official veterinarian
PZ	Protection zone
RCA	Regional competent authority
SVD	Swine Vesicular Disease
SZ	Surveillance zone

## **1 INTRODUCTION**

The mission took place in Italy from 17 to 26 June 2008. The mission team comprised two inspectors from the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO). For ASF, the team was supported by a colleague from the Directorate General for 'Health and Consumers' in Brussels. The mission was undertaken as part of the FVO's planned mission programme. Throughout the mission the inspection team was accompanied by representatives from the central competent authority (CCA), the regional competent authority (RCA) and the local competent authority (ASL).

An opening meeting was held in Brescia, province of Lombardy. At this meeting, the objectives, and the itinerary for, the mission were confirmed by the inspection team and additional information requested for the performance of the mission by the inspection team.

## **2 OBJECTIVES OF THE MISSION**

The objectives of the mission were to review and evaluate the measures taken by the Italian authorities (CA) in relation to the African swine fever (ASF) eradication programme in Sardinia, including those in relation to the recommendations of the FVO report DG(SANCO)7706/2005, and the measures taken in relation to swine vesicular disease (SVD) in the affected regions.

In particular, attention was paid to:

- Elaboration, implementation and control of the eradication plans;
- Action taken by the CAs to detect and control outbreaks of both diseases in domestic pigs and, in the case of ASF, in feral pigs;
- Measures taken to prevent the dissemination of the diseases;
- Action taken to identify and combat the cause(s) for the persistence of the diseases in some areas
- Controls in place to avoid the spread of ASF outside the territory of Sardinia.

The following sites were visited:

CA	Central CCA	1
	Regional RCA	1
	Local ASL	6
	Institutes	2
Farms		4
Markets		1
Dealers' Premises		2
Slaughterhouses		2
Meat Production Establishment		1
Port		1

### **3 LEGAL BASIS FOR THE MISSION**

The mission was carried out under the general provisions of Community legislation and, in particular Article 45 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

The EU legislation relevant to this mission is listed in the Annex. In each case, the reference is to the latest amended version.

### **4 BACKGROUND**

A follow-up mission on ASF was planned by the FVO for 2008 in order to assess the evolution of the situation and the on-going control activities. In 2008, four outbreaks of ASF were documented in the same area of a province of Sardinia and one in another province.

SVD has been reported to continue in some regions whilst there are no further cases reported in others. In 2008, four outbreaks of SVD had been reported at the time of the mission (Calabria, Campania, Emilia Romana).

Details of the outbreaks and an overview of the situation of both diseases were presented to the Commission and are available on the internet, e.g. at [http://ec.europa.eu/food/committees/regulatory/scfcah/animal\\_health/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/food/committees/regulatory/scfcah/animal_health/index_en.htm)

### **5 MAIN FINDINGS**

## 5.1 COMPETENT AUTHORITY CONTROL SYSTEM

### 5.1.1 Legislation

New legislation on the registration of holdings, animal identification and movement, and the use of the national data base was published during the mission (18.6.2008).

#### 5.1.1.1 SVD

The mission team was informed that the national eradication and surveillance plan for SVD and classical swine fever would be replaced shortly after the mission with the updated 2008 version approved by Commission Decision 2007/782/EC. The main changes are the prevalence rate for monitoring SVD (now 5 %) and the strengthening of controls on dealers' premises.

A new eradication and surveillance plan for 2009 has been forwarded to the Commission.

Observations:

- The original eradication plan from 2001 was still in force when the mission took place. However, the new plan had been available for more than a year and one region was already using it.
- Two regions (Lombardia and Emilia Romagna) have regional eradication and surveillance plans in place with more restrictive measures and further obligations in respect of bio-security for commercial holdings.
- The CCA had not been informed of one of those regional plans.
- A regional decree from Lombardia restricted the activities of the dealers' premises for pigs. At the time of the mission no dealer was active.

#### 5.1.1.2 ASF

The eradication plan from 2007 is being applied. The 2008 plan has been approved by the Commission (Commission Decision 2007/782/EC) but not yet published in Italy and the plan for 2009 has been presented to the Commission for co-financing.

Following a change of regional legislation, the onus is now on the owner of a holding to demonstrate compliance with the bio-security requirements in order for a holding to be approved and for compensation to be paid in the event of an outbreak.

Observations:

- To standardise the application of Commission Decision 2005/363/EC, the RCA of Sardinia has introduced additional documentary requirements for animal movements to guarantee that the certification is standardised and in compliance with that Decision.
- The new rules resulted in several pig holdings involved in ASF outbreaks in 2007 and 2008 not being compensated as they did not fulfil the necessary requirements.

Furthermore, sanctions have been imposed on the owners.

- An updated list of establishments approved to send pigmeat and pigmeat products out of Sardinia has not been sent to the Commission every six months, contrary to the provisions of Article 7(a) of Commission Decision 2005/363/EC.

### *5.1.2 Organisation of CA*

The general structure of the CA remains as described in previous reports.

#### *5.1.2.1 SVD*

In one region visited, the Experimental Zooprophyllactic Institute (IZS) hosts both the National Reference Laboratory on SVD and the Institute for Epidemiological Observation (OEVR). As the OEVR is a regional institute, it works mainly within the region but is also at the service of other parts of Italy. The function of the OEVR is to monitor the situation, provide epidemiological analysis in case of outbreaks and give advice on the measures to be taken. The other region visited for SVD does not have an OEVR.

Observations:

- In the cases reviewed, adequate communication between all CAs involved was demonstrated.
- An outbreak that involved the tracing of animals from another region and correspondence between the regions was documented in the local files and presented to the mission team.

#### *5.1.2.2 ASF*

Sardinia has an IZS and an OEVR, both of which concentrate their work on ASF. The details of the CA have been given in previous reports.

The team was given a presentation of the measures taken according to the recommendations of the last report. The CCA is now directly informed by the ASL in case of an outbreak. A feedback system was put in place to ensure communication and cooperation of all bodies involved.

Observations:

- Adequate communication between all CAs was demonstrated although communication with the Forest Services was described as complicated.
- An outbreak that involved co-operation between two ASLs to create the surveillance zone (SZ) was only officially communicated via the region some weeks after the outbreak. Nonetheless the ASLs had already established their mutual SZ via direct bi-lateral contacts.
- Epidemiological tracing was not always performed in sufficient detail.

### *5.1.3 Audits, controls and communication*



Observations:

- There is a system for audits by the CCA in the regions. However, the audits had not covered ASF and SVD controls in the regions visited.
- One province of Sicily has a system of internal and external audits in place, and procedures for SVD were covered by them. In the other province visited there was no evidence of any system to verify the effectiveness of official controls.
- A joint inspection by the CCA and the CA of the Ministry of Interior on SVD in a region has been performed but no outcome or recommendations have been given to the ASL.
- Some incomplete documents had been accepted and animals at a dealer's premises were often noted to have been kept for longer than 30 days.

## **5.2 HOLDING REGISTRATION, ANIMAL IDENTIFICATION AND MOVEMENT CONTROLS**

### Holding registration

In two regions visited, almost 100 % of the registered pig holdings had been entered into the national data base and it was frequently updated.

All pig holdings had been geo-referenced and in case of outbreaks the definition of protection zone (PZ) and SZ is fast and efficient.

Another region had been entering the data on the animal health status of each holding since 2006 and updated this information after each planned visit.

Observations:

- The national data base for pigs is still incomplete. However, in the regions visited, its use had improved since the previous mission. Geo-references had been added and some regions entered the animal health status.
- Visits to update the holding situation on SVD are undertaken as foreseen in the eradication plan. Their frequency depends on the type of holding. Samples are taken according to the plan.
- The health status of dealers is not clear. One region indicated that no health status was allocated to dealers' premises. However, another region indicated that according to the legislation, the status should be suspended in case of a positive sample result and, therefore, a health status should be granted to those holdings.
- The definition of small holdings varies between the regions visited; the maximum number of pigs is between two and four, some not allowing the holding to have a breeding sow. The new legislation on holding registration, identification and pig movements applicable from 18.6.2008 gives a clear definition of small holdings to avoid regional variations and enable a uniform approach.
- Cross-checks of the data base with movement documents, holding registers and other documents by the mission team revealed no discrepancies.

### Movement controls

For the movement of pigs a standard form, "model 4", has to be used, providing detailed information on the holding of origin and destination, identification of the animals, means of transport and animal health status.

During the SVD restrictions, permission for movement to defined slaughter houses outside the restricted area had been given on the basis of welfare (notified to the Commission 8.2.2008), requiring pre-notification to the slaughterhouse, official sealing of trucks transporting the animals and a negative serology test.

Movements of pigs in Sardinia are not restricted for approved holdings from the high risk area. There are also requirements for testing pigs before moving them to a slaughter house if the meat is going to be eligible to leave the island.

Observations:

- Animals that go to markets and are not sold but taken back to the farm may not appear in the holding register as having been moved at all.
- In a market visited, the forms "model 4" did not always give the complete information on the holding's health status concerning SVD and this had not been detected by the OV.
- Movement documents in Sardinia did not always give the information on ASF.

Accredited farms are visited regularly by the OV. One holding accredited for ASF was visited.

Observations:

- The number of animals reported by the holder in the yearly census did not match with the number of animals documented in the holding register.
- Piglets born on the holding are entered in groups of 120 or 150 animals.

### **5.3 CA CONTROLS FOR ERADICATION AND SURVEILLANCE**

#### *5.3.1 SVD*

In 2007, one region registered a high number of outbreaks in a densely populated area for pigs and adopted the decision to depopulate preventively all the holdings in the PZ. The other region reported the last outbreak in 2006 and 3 seropositive samples in 2007 (single reactors).

Pig holdings are visited regularly according to the plan for eradication and surveillance of SVD in the regions visited. In case of outbreaks, the CA may create a crisis unit to support a local team.

Observations:

- In the high pig density region, all holdings registered in the national data base, including small holdings, were checked during the outbreak.
- Dealers' premises are said by the CA to play an important role for the spread of SVD. In one region visited their activities are restricted by regional decrees. In the

other region visited, the national data base shows 21 active dealers and assembly centres.

- In one dealer's premises visited, the records showed that the facilities were not cleaned and disinfected after each batch of animals left the holding and that occasionally pigs stayed for more than 30 days. The structure of the walls did not allow effective cleaning. The frequent visits by the CA did not detect any of these shortcomings.
- In one outbreak, documentation indicated that tracing back had not been performed completely. Movement of pigs from another region had been followed up but a movement from another province nearby had been overlooked. The OV indicated that in case of an outbreak, movement of animals is investigated up to one month before the positive case instead of since the last negative sampling as required by the national plan for dealers' premises.
- Apart from this, outbreaks were managed well. Documents on cases, suspects, routine visits and follow-up were easily available in the ASLs visited and found to be complete.
- One region had interlinked the national data base with the regional data base on laboratory analysis for SVD. With this tool, cases were followed quickly and easily in that region.
- Communication between regions concerned (movements of animals, shared SZ) was generally well documented.
- The equipment for the CA to take on to a farm with suspected SVD was checked in one ASL. It was found to be complete and ready to use. The checklist of the manual had been used to provide the necessary items.

### 5.3.2 ASF

Illegal free range holdings were reported to be the main source of infection. They are said to be in a remote area of one province only but their number and size are unknown. They are seen as the source of contact between wild boars and domestic pigs that keeps the virus circulating in both populations.

Results of serological tests of wild boar are available online. In infected areas, the carcasses must be retained until the test result is given. The CA reported that approximately one third of hunted boars are tested which they considered low for surveillance purposes. However, the number of samples was said to be sufficient to detect the presence of the disease and thus to make a map of infected areas.

Accredited farms have to maintain their status and be accredited once a year for movement of pigs to a slaughterhouse for meat leaving the island. Only accredited farms can move pigs to other holdings and movement from holdings to slaughter houses to send the meat out of the island is not permitted even for accredited farms if they are situated in the high risk area.

Outbreaks are to be notified to the Ministry, the OEVR and the region at the same time.

Observations:

- Serological tests were performed without delay as described in the eradication plan.
- In some cases, the repopulation of holdings took place only after more than a year after the outbreak.
- In a series of four outbreaks, the CA had not started to perform farm visits and sampling until several weeks after establishing the PZ and SZ. The delay was explained by the late arrival of the legal authorisation from the region and acute staff shortage.
- Tracing back and forward for epidemiology purposes was insufficiently detailed in some cases.
- In an establishment for meat products, blank pages were found within the required documentation of the OV tasks as had been found in another establishment in 2005 (see mission report 7706 of 2005). This had not been seen by the ASL when supervising the OV. The owner of the establishment had specific procedures for the OV to check the traceability before signing each certificate for meat products leaving Sardinia that could not be explained easily by the OV.
- In a slaughterhouse visited, slaughter of animals for sale of their meat outside Sardinia is carried out separately from other slaughter. Ante and post mortem inspections were documented. Some mistakes were found in the certification of meat leaving Sardinia. A certificate quoted the wrong movement documents (and thus the wrong farm of origin of the pigs) but all the meat certified was declared eligible to be sent outside Sardinia. The filing system for certificates and supporting documentation was inadequate (e.g. movement documents were attached to the wrong commercial documents; commercial documents were filed without the form 4). This had not been detected by the CA supervising the OVs.
- Cooperation with port and airport control authorities had been started after the last mission. OVs visit ports and airports once per month to check on the display of information and on shops situated after the check-in to ensure that they do not sell pork or pig meat products produced in Sardinia. The prohibition of pork and pig meat products to be taken out of Sardinia is controlled by x-raying hand luggage and by random checks of passenger cars in the port visited by the inspection team.
- Pilot projects to handle the situation of the clandestine free range farms have been launched. They consist of a fenced area that will be handled as a holding (one epidemiological unit) where different owners may keep free-range pigs; each maintaining a separate holding register.
- In one case, there was no evidence that all the farms in the surveillance area had been visited.
- PZ and SZ were established using electronic software. However, in one ASL visited this was not possible because many pig holdings were not yet geo-referenced.

## 6 CONCLUSIONS

## **6.1 COMPETENT AUTHORITY CONTROL SYSTEM**

### *6.1.1 Legislation*

#### *6.1.1.1 SVD*

The national and regional eradication and surveillance plans on SVD are followed by all CAs visited.

#### *6.1.1.2 ASF*

The changes in the regional legislation are a useful tool to ensure the cooperation of pig owners as they no longer receive compensation unless the holding is considered to have adequate bio-security.

In general, Commission Decision 2005/363/EC is applied adequately with the exception of the lack of communication referred to in point 5.1.1.2, third bullet point.

### *6.1.2 Organisation of CAs*

Generally the CAs are well prepared to react to suspect cases or outbreaks. However, the epidemiology is not always adequately performed and some aspects of the follow-up of outbreaks are delayed. This may result in the CA not receiving necessary and timely information.

### *6.1.3 Audit, controls and communication*

The lack of procedures to verify the effectiveness of official controls that the CA carry out as required in Regulation (EC) No 882/2004, Article 8, 3 (a), result in mistakes made by the OVs not being detected and corrected.

In general, communication between CAs on the subjects of SVD and ASF is adequate. However, a failure to communicate to the ASL the outcome of inspections by the CCA, in a region with SVD, meant that no corrective action could be taken.

## **6.2 HOLDING REGISTRATION, ANIMAL IDENTIFICATION AND MOVEMENT CONTROLS**

The incomplete data base does not allow sufficient information to be extracted in case of disease outbreaks. However, in two of the regions visited, the data base had been filled in such a way as to make it a valuable tool in case of regional emergencies.

Repeat visits to holdings and sample-taking to update the situation on SVD are a source of rapid information on the individual and overall situation. However, this is weakened by the lack of supervision of the performance of the OV responsible for checking movement documents that may lack crucial information.

For animals that have passed through a market without being registered, traceability in case of outbreaks will be difficult or impossible.

### 6.3 CA CONTROLS

The eradication and monitoring plans for both diseases are a good tool for the regions with their different structures of pig holdings.

Since the last mission on ASF in 2005, significant progress in the eradication of the disease has been made in various areas. However, shortcomings in control and supervision of the OVAs and CAs jeopardise the standard of bio security in holdings and control of animal movements.

### 7 CLOSING MEETING

A closing meeting was held on 26.6.2008 in the offices of the CCA. At this meeting, the main findings of the inspection were presented by the inspection team and preliminary conclusions drawn on the observations. The CCA was given the opportunity to comment on the remarks and added further information requested by the inspection team.

### 8 RECOMMENDATIONS

Some Pre Text

No.	Recommendation
1	To further complete the information necessary in the national data base as required by Commission Decision 2000/678/EC to make it an efficient tool for disease control.
2	To ensure that the measures to eradicate and monitor SVD are correctly applied in all areas as foreseen in the eradication and monitoring plan approved by Commission Decision 2000/774/EC.
3	To continue and strengthen the new approaches for the eradication of ASF while continuing with the established control measures of the eradication plan approved by Commission Decisions 2005/362/EC and 2005/363/EC to overcome the last obstacles that prevent Sardinia from becoming free of ASF.
4	To establish the audits and controls required by Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 to ensure the correct application of the control systems for SVD and ASF.
5	To ensure complete and regular information to the Commission as required by Commission Decision 2005/363/EC.

The competent authority's response to the recommendations can be found at:

[http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/ap/ap\\_italy\\_7801\\_2008.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/ap/ap_italy_7801_2008.pdf)

## ANNEX 1 - LIST OF LEGISLATION REFERENCED IN THE REPORT

Reference	OJ Ref.	Detail
Directive 92/119/EEC	OJ L 62, 15.3.1993, p. 69–85	Council Directive 92/119/EEC of 17 December 1992 introducing general Community measures for the control of certain animal diseases and specific measures relating to swine vesicular disease
Directive 2002/60/EC	OJ L 192, 20.7.2002, p. 27–46	Council Directive 2002/60/EC of 27 June 2002 laying down specific provisions for the control of African swine fever and amending Directive 92/119/EEC as regards Teschen disease and African swine fever
Directive 64/432/EEC	OJ 121, 29.7.1964, p. 1977–2012	Council Directive 64/432/EEC of 26 June 1964 on animal health problems affecting intra-Community trade in bovine animals and swine
Directive 82/894/EEC	OJ L 378, 31.12.1982, p. 58–62	Council Directive 82/894/EEC of 21 December 1982 on the notification of animal diseases within the Community
Directive 90/425/EEC	OJ L 224, 18.8.1990, p. 29–41	Council Directive 90/425/EEC of 26 June 1990 concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable in intra-Community trade in certain live animals and products with a view to the completion of the internal market
Directive 89/662/EEC	OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, p. 13–22	Council Directive 89/662/EEC of 11 December 1989 concerning veterinary checks in intra-Community trade with a view to the completion of the internal market
Directive 92/102/EEC	OJ L 355, 5.12.1992, p. 32–36	Council Directive 92/102/EEC of 27 November 1992 on the identification and registration of animals
Directive 2002/99/EC	OJ L 18, 23.1.2003, p. 11–20	Council Directive 2002/99/EC of 16 December 2002 laying down the animal health rules governing the production, processing, distribution and introduction of products of animal origin for human consumption
Regulation (EC) No 852/2004	OJ L 139, 30.4.2004, p. 1, Corrected and re-published in OJ L 226, 25.6.2004, p. 3	Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs
Regulation	OJ L 139,	Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of the European

<b>Reference</b>	<b>OJ Ref.</b>	<b>Detail</b>
(EC) No 853/2004	30.4.2004, p. 55, Corrected and re-published in OJ L 226, 25.6.2004, p. 22	Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific hygiene rules for food of animal origin
Regulation (EC) No 854/2004	OJ L 139, 30.4.2004, p. 206, Corrected and re-published in OJ L 226, 25.6.2004, p. 83	Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific rules for the organisation of official controls on products of animal origin intended for human consumption
Regulation (EC) No 882/2004	OJ L 165, 30.4.2004, p. 1, Corrected and re-published in OJ L 191, 28.5.2004, p. 1	Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules
Decision 2000/678/EC	OJ L 281, 7.11.2000, p. 16–17	2000/678/EC: Commission Decision of 23 October 2000 laying down detailed rules for registration of holdings in national databases for porcine animals as foreseen by Council Directive 64/432/EEC
Decision 98/139/EC	OJ L 38, 12.2.1998, p. 10–13	98/139/EC: Commission Decision of 4 February 1998 laying down certain detailed rules concerning on-the-spot checks carried out in the veterinary field by Commission experts in the Member States
Decision 73/53/EC	OJ L 83, 30.3.1973, p. 43–43	73/53/EEC: Commission Decision of 26 February 1973 concerning protective measures to be applied by the Member States against swine vesicular disease
Decision 2000/774/EC	OJ L 308, 8.12.2000, p. 39–44	2000/774/EC: Commission Decision of 30 November 2000 approving the programmes for the eradication and monitoring of animal diseases and for the prevention of zoonoses presented for the year 2001 by the Member States
Decision 2003/422/EC	OJ L 143, 11.6.2003, p. 35–49	2003/422/EC: Commission Decision of 26 May 2003 approving an African swine fever diagnostic manual



<b>Reference</b>	<b>OJ Ref.</b>	<b>Detail</b>
Decision 2005/362/EC	OJ L 118, 5.5.2005, p. 37–38	2005/362/EC: Commission Decision of 2 May 2005 approving the plan for the eradication of African swine fever in feral pigs in Sardinia, Italy
Decision 2005/363/EC	OJ L 118, 5.5.2005, p. 39–46	2005/363/EC: Commission Decision of 2 May 2005 concerning animal health protection measures against African swine fever in Sardinia, Italy
Decision 2005/624/EC	OJ L 219, 24.8.2005, p. 45–46	2005/624/EC: Commission Decision of 22 August 2005 concerning a derogation on the marking of pigmeat and its subsequent use for certain holdings in a surveillance zone of African swine fever in Sardinia, Italy
Decision 2007/488/EC	OJ L 182, 12.7.2007, p. 34–35	2007/488/EC: Commission Decision of 11 July 2007 granting exemptions to Italy under Council Directive 92/119/EEC for the transport of pigs for slaughter on public and private roads to a slaughterhouse within protection zones in Cremona
Decision 2007/782/EC	OJ L 314, 1.12.2007, p. 29–39	2007/782/EC: Commission Decision of 30 November 2007 approving annual and multi-annual national programmes and the financial contribution from the Community for the eradication, control and monitoring of certain animal diseases and zoonoses, presented by the Member States for 2008 and following years